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Abstract
The three food crops of wheat, maize, and rice make up almost two-thirds of
the world’s dietary energy needs. Of these three, just six countries provide 70%
of the global supply. Furthermore, soybeans account for three-quarters of global
livestock feed, and only three countries provide 80% of the global supply. Considering
over half of the world’s exported supply of these four commodities are exported via
maritime means, the free flow of marine traffic becomes paramount. Current models
lack the ability to capture the inherent variance displayed in the maritime transport
system, which can lead to inaccurate assumptions about how the system functions -
assumptions that could ultimately bring chaos to an importing economy.
To capture this inherent variance, a discrete-event simulation was built to better
understand how disruptions in this system impact those who rely on its unhindered
functionality. Monthly export data is used, and the maritime chokepoints of the
Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Gibraltar are modeled for disruption.
Results indicate significant food shortages for all importers studied, with some
receiving 97% less of a commodity in a given month. China is particularly sensitive
to a closure of the Panama Canal in the months of September - January. Egypt and
Spain could expect significant food decreases if the Strait of Gibraltar were to close
in any month, with Spain experiencing its worst declines should a disruption occur
in September. Marine traffic through the Strait of Malacca was also significantly
impacted when any of the three chokepoints studied were closed.
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SIMULATING MARITIME CHOKEPOINT DISRUPTION IN THE GLOBAL
FOOD SUPPLY
I. Introduction
1.1 Background
Every year, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force publishes his or her Professional
Reading List. This reading list “provides a range of professional development oppor-
tunities to refocus our thinking on the challenges that this new era brings” (Goldfein,
2017). In 2017, Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) General David L. Goldfein
added The Accidental Superpower by Peter Zeihan to his yearly list. Specifically, the
CSAF Professional Reading List (2017) offered the following concerning the General’s
choice:
The global security environment is evolving faster than any of us can
fathom, and in the coming century America will be challenged across the
spectrum of conflict in ways we cannot imagine. We must have Airmen
leading our force who can quickly and deliberately synthesize a number
of competing theories on the current and future state of global affairs.
This book provides a glimpse [of] one of these possible futures, where our
nation will find itself confronting a world where the global systems as we
know them rapidly evolve in the face of relentless change.
The book’s full title, “The Accidental Superpower: The Next Generation of Amer-
ican Preeminence and the Coming Global Disorder,” is predominately concerned with
analyzing the variables that led to the rise of nations as we know them today, then
forecasts their paths forward (Zeihan, 2014). According to the author, these paths
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are determined by a nation’s geography, political climate, and demography. The au-
thor’s assessments are compelling, if not startling. Then, perhaps coincidentally, the
U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Mark A. Milley added Zeihan’s book to his 2017
Professional Reading List as well.
The rise of globalization and the global economy is irrefutable – the world is now
more connected than ever. Never has there been an age where nations depended so
heavily on other nations for their survival. According to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (2018), Saudi Arabia was the world’s second highest producer of Total
Petroleum and Other Liquids products, producing 12% of the world’s total in 2017
(the United States was first at nearly 16%). These vast oil reserves have made Saudi
Arabia quite rich. In a time when millions of barrels of oil are required every day
by every developed country in the world in order to simply keep the lights on, this
gives Saudi Arabia a power money cannot buy. The developed world knows oil is a
requirement for survival.
However, oil is just a resource. It’s simply an input. Merriam-Webster Online
(2019) defines a resource as “a natural feature or phenomenon that enhances the
quality of human life.” Yes, oil certainly does enhance the quality of human life,
but the definition implies oil is not a requirement for human life – it’s only there to
“enhance.” What then, if not oil, would be a resource that’s a requirement for human
life? One answer is food, which can be captured in a model using a representative set
of cereals and soybeans (Jones and Ejeta, 2016; Wellesley et al., 2017).
Unless a food-importing country borders a food-exporting country, foodstuffs
will most likely be shipped via maritime means. Maritime shipping is cheap and
can accommodate large amounts of product, which makes it an ideal transportation
mode even if countries border each other. Figure 1 depicts maritime shipping routes
recorded in May 2012:
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Figure 1. Eurasia Maritime Shipping Routes (Kiln, 2019)
As can be seen in Figure 1, the only routes ships do not take are ones with
draft requirements (the water is too shallow). Other than draft, ships can essentially
navigate the globe unrestricted, traveling the shortest most direct route to save time
and money. However, these routes often pass through global maritime chokepoints.
Merriam-Webster Online (2019) defines a chokepoint as “a strategic narrow route
providing passage through or to another region.” In the case of maritime shipping,
these chokepoints connect one geographic body of water to another. The disruption
of the free flow of global cereals and soybeans through these chokepoints is the focus
of this paper.
1.2 Problem Statement
To understand the relationship between global maritime chokepoints and a coun-
try’s level of food security, the current maritime transportation system must be con-
sidered. This research uses historical data inside the simulation software Simio to
3
model the maritime transportation system of cereals and soybeans through different
maritime chokepoints. Results from this simulation model are analyzed to determine
the impact a disruption of maritime chokepoints has on the global supply of cereals
and soybeans.
1.3 Scope
The world’s population is growing at an alarming rate, with each person requiring
food to survive. As countries grow, many cannot feed their citizens purely from within
and must reach out beyond their borders. According to Bailey and Wellesley (2017),
each year 2.8 billion people are fed via the global transport system. Maize, rice, and
wheat make up almost two-thirds of the world’s caloric needs (Jones and Ejeta, 2016).
Of these, only six countries provide 70% of the global supply. Furthermore, soybeans
account for three-quarters of global livestock feed, and only three countries provide
80% of the global supply (Wellesley et al., 2017). Over half of these foods are shipped
over water and pass through maritime chokepoints, exposing an importing country
to increased risk of weather-related delays, piracy, and terrorism.
This research seeks to analyze seasonal maritime chokepoint risk in the global
transportation system of cereals and soybeans. Thus, a simulated abstraction of the
global maritime shipping system is needed so that seasonal risk can be quantified and
further understood.
1.4 Simulations of Maritime Transportation
Given the global use of maritime shipping and its importance to economic well–
being, the modeling of maritime networks is a frequent endeavor. Specifically, con-
cerning the variation introduced by weather, ship speeds, and varying crop yields,
simulation has been the preferred analytic method of choice to capture this vari-
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ability. Qu and Meng (2012) used a Cellular Automata (CA) simulation model in
conjunction with a discrete-event simulation to simulate ship movements through the
Singapore Strait. According to the authors, CA models are capable of capturing
complex driving behavior and have been used previously in modeling roadway traffic,
discretizing traffic lanes into small cells with vehicles moving from cell to cell based
on a pre-defined velocity. The authors then used discrete-event simulation to model
random events such as arrivals, weather, wind, sea current, and tide.
Caris et al. (2011) developed a discrete-event simulation to model alternative
transport options for container barges in the port area of Antwerp. The author’s
analysis was mainly concerned with the impact different hub scenarios had on waiting
times and turnaround times for vessels within the port area. Furthermore, Smith
et al. (2009) modeled ship congestion in the Upper Mississippi River with a discrete-
event simulation, using entities to represent six different classes of ships. The authors
focused on vessel movements and lock operations in the river system, examining ship
activities under a wide range of operating conditions.
Concerning global chokepoints, Köse et al. (2003) used a discrete-event simulation
to model ship traffic flowing through the Istanbul Strait (part of the Turkish Straits).
The Istanbul strait links the Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara, and is a mere
698m wide at its narrowest point making it the world’s narrowest Strait. The authors
modeled ships as entities and considered various sizes of ships and the impact of bad
weather conditions – both of which can reduce the flow of traffic to one-direction or
close the Strait completely. Various scenarios were then considered, including varying
ship arrival and waiting times at the headwaters. Simulation results found that an
increase of ship arrivals of just 36% to the Strait causes ship waiting times to jump
from a mere 16 minutes to 918 minutes. Mavrakis and Kontinakis (2008) built a
similar discrete-event simulation to model maritime traffic through the Strait as well
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and arrived at similar results.
Based upon studies such as those presented here, the use of discrete-event simula-
tion provides a proven approach to explore the many different factors that influence
this type of system.
1.5 Methodology
Moving food via maritime means requires the study and use of the global maritime
transport system. Transport system terminology, however, is divided among authors,
and often depends on geography and traffic mode (Woxenius, 2007). Therefore, the
generic framework provided by Woxenius (2007) is used. Six generic transportation
system designs are considered for this model: direct link, corridor, hub-and-spoke,
connected hubs, static routes, and dynamic routes. Figure 2 enumerates these six
designs, providing routes from the Origin (O) to the Destination (D):
Figure 2. Transport Network Designs (Woxenius, 2007)
The direct link approach simply provides a direct route from origin to destination,
with no coordination or visitation with any nodes in-between (Woxenius, 2007). A
real-world maritime example of this design would be the travel between two inward-
facing ports, where each port has open line-of-sight of the other. A ship traveling
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from one port to the other can travel on a straight line to its destination.
The connected hubs design can be considered a direct-link design with regional
consolidation, meaning hubs on the route can still be bypassed if there is a more
direct route available. However, instead of a direct route being taken from origin to
destination, a regional hub must first be visited to reach the destination (Woxenius,
2007). Considering maritime transport, this design would be used when no direct
line-of-sight is available between ports.
The last design considered is the dynamic routes design. Dynamic routes are
determined in real-time and depend on the current transport environment. Given
the circumstances of real-world events, any combination of hubs may be visited from
origin to destination - whichever combination of hubs providing the best option at the
time would be chosen. Dynamic routes provide maximum flexibility in route planning
(Woxenius, 2007). Considering maritime transport again, dynamic routes would be
considered when the ocean travel environment is constantly changing. For example,
if a ship’s route includes a visit to a hub as it proceeds to its destination and the hub
is subsequently closed, the ship must dynamically find an alternate route to avoid
this closed hub. For purposes of this model, a combination of direct link, connected
hubs, and dynamic routes is used.
According to Qu and Meng (2012), a simulation of ship movement should contain
four elements: a ship, the location of a ship, the speed of a ship, and finally a time
aspect. These elements are used in designing the simulation for this study. Every
ship in this discrete-event simulation is an entity carrying a certain amount of either
maize, wheat, or soybeans. Ships also receive a speed and final location. Once a final
location is given, a route is assigned that minimizes total distance traveled.
To model location, Simio utilizes a framework known as a geographic information
system (GIS). This framework provides the capability of inserting a drawn-to-scale
7
background map of the entire world. This allows the modeler to place objects at
exact lat–long coordinates, and also provides accurate distance calculations between
two points. It is then possible to have entities move from one location to another
using the exact real–world distance.
Speed is modeled using a triangular distribution, based on real-world data using
a mode, high, and low speed. Once assigned, the speed of the ship does not change.
Time is represented by a system clock with simulated events occurring at discrete
points in time.
1.6 Outline
Chapter 2 provides additional details on further maritime transportation research,
model development, and analytical results. Chapter 3 is a real–world application of
the model. Chapter 4 concludes this thesis by discussing significant findings and rec-
ommendations for further research. Chapters 2 and 3 are structured as an individual
journal paper and conference proceeding, respectively.
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II. Simulating Maritime Chokepoint Disruption in the
Global Food Supply
2.1 Introduction
Only three food crops (maize, rice, and wheat) make up almost two-thirds of the
world’s dietary energy needs (Jones and Ejeta, 2016). Of these three cereals, just
six countries provide 70% of the global supply. Furthermore, soybeans account for
three-quarters of global livestock feed, and only three countries provide 80% of the
global supply (Wellesley et al., 2017). These four megacrops are the backbone of the
global food supply. Figure 3 details the top countries producing these crops.
Figure 3. Global Cereal and Soybean Producers (Wellesley et al., 2017)
The worlds population is now over seven billion people and growing, each one
requiring food to survive. Many countries have populations that are too large to
feed with locally-sourced food and must reach out beyond their borders to feed their
citizens. According to Bailey and Wellesley (2017), 2.8 billion people are fed via the
global transport system each year. Assuming a population of seven billion people in
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the world, this equates to 40% of the world’s population is reliant on global transport
to meet their daily caloric needs.
Given the global requirement for imported food, transportation becomes impor-
tant. A large proportion of the world’s traded cereals and soybeans are shipped
via maritime means (Bailey and Wellesley, 2017). Once loaded, these ships follow
accepted maritime shipping routes, as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Eurasia Maritime Shipping Routes - Background Removed (Kiln, 2019)
As can be seen in Figure 4, larger amounts of ship activity indicate where global
populations might reside or is on the way, as evidenced by the thicker brighter con-
centrations (for example, the brightness of China’s eastern coast).
However, bright spots away from global population centers indicate ships on their
respective shipping routes. In some instances, thicker concentrations indicate direct
point-to-point movement, saving both time and money. In others, however, these
concentrations indicate the presence of global chokepoints.
Chokepoint analysis to date has mostly been concerned with the free flow of the
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global oil supply. According to the U.S Energy Information Administration (EIA),
“chokepoints are a critical part of global energy security because of the high volume
of petroleum and other liquids transported through their narrow straits,” and EIA
has declared seven global chokepoints for global seaborne oil transportation. These
oil chokepoints are the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal, Bab
el-Mandeb, the Danish Straits, the Turkish Straits, and the Panama Canal. The U.S.
EIA also includes the Cape of Good Hope as it is part of a major trading route and is
an alternative route to other chokepoints (U.S. Energy Information Administration,
2018).
Figure 5. Major Oil Routes and Chokepoints (U.S. Energy Information Administra-
tion, 2018)
For example, if Europe desired to trade with China (as it often does), then a ship
traveling from Europe would have to pass through the Strait of Gibraltar (depending
on which country in Europe the cargo originated), the Suez Canal, Bab-el-Mandeb,
the Straits of Malacca, and the South China Sea. In total, five global chokepoints
must be traversed before a ship traveling from Europe can reach China. Alternatively,
a route including the Cape of Good Hope (a route around the southern-most tip of
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Africa) is feasible and would reduce the number of chokepoints traversed, but if one
considers the Cape of Good Hope as a global chokepoint, this route only reduces the
number of global chokepoints traversed by one. It also greatly increases the distance
and time of voyage. Figure 6 highlights both traditional and non-traditional global
maritime chokepoints.
Figure 6. Traditional Global Chokepoints (Wellesley et al., 2017)
Traveling on a route that includes maritime chokepoints is not necessarily bad -
the route is often shorter and allows shipping companies to reduce costs and save
time. However, for nations that depend on imported food to survive, disruptions to
these chokepoints could quickly become a national security issue.
2.2 Overview
Transportation risk has been widely studied in the case of the global oil supply
chain, as roughly 61% of the worlds traded oil supply was shipped via maritime means
in 2015. In the event of a chokepoint disruption, energy costs and world oil prices
could increase substantially. Idle tankers would also be left vulnerable to pirate,
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terrorist, or hostile nation attacks (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2014).
Between 1991 - 2001, 66% of the worlds piracy attacks occurred in the Straits of
Malacca. In 2008, Somali pirates hijacked a Saudi Arabia-owned supertanker 450
miles southeast of Mombasa, Kenya (Wu et al., 2009). Piracy is a growing concern,
and the future of maritime shipping indicates no slowing of volatility in the industry
(Viljoen and Joubert, 2016).
Piracy, however, is typically conducted by non-state actors. Throughout history,
Iran has repeatedly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, with its most recent
threat being July 2018 in response to U.S. reinstating oil sanctions against the nation.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (2018) lists the Strait of Hormuz as the
worlds most important chokepoint, given that it sees roughly 30% of all maritime-
traded crude oil and other liquids. In 2016 the strait enjoyed a record high oil flow
of 18.5 million barrels per day. Furthermore, 80% of the oil transported through
the strait was destined for Asian markets - specifically China, Japan, South Korea,
India, and Singapore (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2014). Should Iran
close the Strait of Hormuz, the Asian countries listed would be left searching for an
alternate oil supply chain.
The free unhindered flow of the global oil supply is paramount to the security of
a nation. Countries who are major oil exporters command the attention of countries
who are major oil importers. What then can be said of the global food supply?
An estimated 55% of globally-traded cereals and soybeans are shipped via mar-
itime means that pass through at least one maritime chokepoint (Bailey and Welles-
ley, 2017). However, since not all oil exporting countries are food exporting countries,
the importance of food chokepoints might differ from existing oil chokepoints, or in-
troduce new chokepoints entirely. For example, according to the United Nations
Statistics Division (2019), the United States is the worlds largest maize exporter and
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second largest soybean exporter, with most of those crops being shipped down the
Mississippi River to the Port of New Orleans. From New Orleans, ships loaded with
food must exit the Gulf of Mexico to reach the Atlantic. Should the Port of New
Orleans experience a direct hit from a hurricane (as it did with Katrina in 2005) or a
hostile nation enter the Gulf of Mexico, the world’s food supply could be impacted.
Unlike oil, chokepoint analysis for the global food supply is scant.
A notable contribution to the study of chokepoints in the global food supply has
been by Wellesley et al. (2017). The authors reconciled multiple maritime shipping
databases into one single database. This single database was then used to power the
Chatham House Maritime Analysis Tool (CH-MAT), an excel-based tool that models
global cereals imports and exports. The tool then allowed the authors to identify
which chokepoints were most important to certain cereals, and then determine which
countries were most at risk to chokepoint disruptions.
Ducruet (2016) modeled global maritime flows as complex networks to measure
the vulnerability of global maritime trade flows through the Suez and Panama Canals.
The author built the network with links weighted by summing the vessel capacities
which passed through established links and nodes in a single year. In the years of
the study, the author determined that North America was the most canal-dependent
region in the world, as the rise of Asia has increased trade flows to the U.S. East Coast.
The author concluded the research stating modeling and simulation could predict the
impact of new shipping routes and further disruptions to the global shipping network.
Viljoen and Joubert (2016) also used complex network theory to model global
container shipping. Their network modeled routes and ports as links and nodes,
respectively. Once built, the authors then systematically removed links and nodes
to determine the global maritime network’s robustness and flexibility. When the
authors removed links in a highly connected core of the network, this greatly impacted
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transshipment alternatives. And when the common skeleton connecting the network
was disrupted, this effected shipping opportunities by reducing the set of shortest
paths between nodes.
The previous two approaches to modeling global maritime supply chains both used
optimization techniques, minimizing either cost or distance. Once links or nodes were
removed, the system would optimize the altered network by sending resources on a dif-
ferent link or to a different node. However, if a supply chain displays variance (demand
variance, quality variance, supplier variance, etc.), then methods of optimization are
inadequate. Simulation is then the tool of choice (Ingalls, 1998). Furthermore, given
the size and complexities of supply chain networks, simulation is considered a valid
approach since it can incorporate uncertainties and adverse external events (Deleris
and Erhun, 2005).
Discrete-event simulation has been used previously to evaluate a country’s food
export supply chain. Lopes et al. (2017) constructed a discrete-event simulation to
improve the efficiency of Brazil’s soybean exports. The authors note that recent stud-
ies into the logistics of grain exportation have generally used static or optimization
models, where the dynamic nature of food production and transportation is not con-
sidered. Given the stochastic nature of discrete-event simulation, the authors chose
to use this modeling technique to better describe their food export system (Lopes
et al., 2017).
The model created by Lopes et al. (2017) considers both single and multi-modal
routes, given the export of Brazils soybeans uses roadways, internal waterways, rail,
and ocean transport. The model chooses from pre-existing routes to get the soybeans
to market in the most cost-effective way. Once the soybeans reach a Brazilian ocean
port, the soybeans are then shipped via maritime transport to Brazil’s principal
soybean importers - Shanghai, China and Hamburg, Germany. Once these soybeans
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are loaded on a ship, the model uses a triangular distribution to determine the ships
speed. Other than ship speed, no other stochastic elements are introduced to the
maritime shipping route.
2.3 Model Development
This research develops a simulation model of a subset of world-wide maritime food
distribution with a focus on chokepoint disruption. The model was built in Simio and
follows the transport methodology of Woxenius (2007). Ships are modeled as entities
and carry a 55,000 Dry Weight Tonnage (Handymax/Supramax class). The ships
move from node to node in what Simio calls “FreeSpace,” with node movements
determined by a node list. In FreeSpace movement, entities simply move in the
direction of the next node and do not require a link or path. This allows the entities
to be easily rerouted should rerouting be necessary. Transshipment activities are not
modeled, as ships are considered dry-bulk and route directly to the importer.
At the start of the simulation, a monthly amount of a commodity (measured
in metric tons) is divided among ships, where the model creates as many ships as
needed to carry that month’s shipment. All ships for that month are created at the
beginning of the month and placed in a delay, where the delay results in an evenly-
spaced division of ships within the specific month. To measure distance, Simio has
recently added the ArcGIS World Imagery functionality, incorporating a hi-resolution
scale satellite map on the background. This functionality also permits placing model
objects using lat/long coordinates (way-points), which allows for accurate distance
measurements.
Given their ubiquity in global diets, the commodities of wheat, maize, and soy-
beans were chosen for this disruption analysis. The importing countries of China,
Japan, Egypt, and Spain were selected due to their large import reliance of at least
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one of the commodities under study. Exporting countries were then selected by evalu-
ating common exporters between the selected importers. Six common exporters were
selected - the United States, Brazil, Canada, Argentina, Ukraine, and Russia. Using
just these six exporters provided a high percentage of an importer’s annual supply of a
commodity. For example, these six exporting countries supplied over 98% of Japan’s
soybean imports in 2017 (United Nations Statistics Division, 2019). Rice was sub-
sequently not considered, as additional exporting countries would be needed. The
addition of rice exporters could be the focus of future research. Additional coverage
proportions are provided in Figure 7.
Figure 7. Annual Imports in 2017. Data source: United Nations Statistics Division
(2019)
In order to approximate maritime route distances, the ArcGIS background map
provided by Simio was used. Starting nodes were placed representing each exporting
country’s primary export location. Russia and Ukraine have their starting nodes in
the Black Sea, and Argentina’s near Buenos Aries. The remaining exporters have
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two export locations each: The United States and Canada have an export location
on both east and west coasts, and Brazil north and south. Given that the data
does not differentiate which coast/port a commodity originated, a percentage is used
to split the monthly commodity amount to a country’s respective coast. Once the
commodity is split and a ship created, the model evaluates any chokepoint closures
and subsequently routes ships to their destinations. Initial travel distances are known
and are used to assign the shortest path to each of the four destinations. Travel
speed is stochastic and is modeled via a triangular distribution, with maximum and
minimum values within 10% of the mean of 14 mph. Monthly commodity export data
is provided by the United Nations Statistics Division (2019), and is also stochastic
via a triangular distribution with maximum and minimum values within 10% of the
United Nations’ reported monthly value.
During initial ship routing, if the primary route is not clear (for example, a choke-
point is closed), the ship evaluates a list of alternate routes and chooses the next
shortest option. This alternate route list contains initial distances measured from
the ship’s point of origin to a destination, so selecting the shortest path is somewhat
trivial. However, if the ship is already underway and a chokepoint is then closed,
these initial distances are no longer valid since the ship is no longer at its origin.
For example, if a ship originating from the Gulf of Mexico is underway to Japan
and the Panama Canal closes, this ship would have three alternate routes to choose
from: Japan via Strait of Gibraltar, Cape of Good Hope, or Cape Horn. The North-
west Passage would also be viable, but northern routes are not considered in this
research. There are many factors that could influence a ship captain’s decision, but
for purposes of this research the route with the smallest distance is chosen. Given
these distances change with every movement of the ship, a dynamic route-measuring
ability was needed.
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Using the above example, a ship underway on a route that would eventually
utilize the Panama Canal would have to instantaneously evaluate the remaining three
options. Therefore at chokepoint closure, the simulation identifies any ship currently
on route to the Panama Canal and begins the rerouting process. In this process, a
ship evaluates options by creating clones of itself that travel all remaining possible
routes nearly instantaneously. Whichever of these clones reaches the destination first
reports the fastest route back to the originating ship, which is then rerouted to that
specific route. This allows for easy and fast rerouting once a chokepoint closes.
The same process is used when a chokepoint is reopened. Again, if the Panama
Canal is reopened after a closure, the simulation identifies all ships that originally
intended to use the Panama Canal and begins the rerouting process once again.
However, when a chokepoint reopens, an additional clone is made to travel the route
the ship is currently on, as the ship might be too far into its alternate route to consider
utilizing the newly opened chokepoint. Again, this allows the ship to evaluate all route
options dynamically.
2.4 Supporting Data
Commodities data used in this model are sourced from the United Nations In-
ternational Trade Statistics Database (known as UN COMTRADE). This database
houses some three billion records from over 170 reporting countries, with records dat-
ing back to 1962. This data is also available in both monthly and annual timeframes,
and is available publicly (United Nations Statistics Division, 2019).
Monthly exports of wheat, maize, and soybeans are imported from UN COM-
TRADE and are subsequently used to determine demand. Monthly data are used
versus annual due to the fact the commodities under study are seasonal - the amount
of grain a country exports depends on the harvest season/month. Using monthly data
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provides insight not only into which chokepoints are most critical for the shipment of
these foodstuffs, but also which month is most critical as well.
2.5 Verification and Validation
Initially, the model was intended to be verified using monthly commodity imports
into each importing country. For example, if the United States shipped 100% of a
country’s wheat in a month and travel time was 30 days, we would expect to see that
same amount a month later on that importers balance sheet. However, this was not
the case. While it is true most foodstuffs are shipped over water, not all are dry-bulk.
An increasing number of food shipments are being containerized, a process that allows
decreased shipping costs as these containers can ship with other containers. This
means containers could spend several months in storage before shipping. Therefore,
comparing simulated travel distances to known travel distances is used as a validation
measure.
The MarineTraffic (2019) database is used to validate model route distances.
MarineTraffic is a leader in ship tracking, using historical Automatic Identification
System (AIS) data to provide accurate estimates of ship movements. The AIS is a
vessel tracking system that utilizes a ship’s on-board transponder to track its where-
abouts. Using MarineTraffic’s Voyage Planner, the distance of 37 unique simulated
routes are compared to their matching real-world routes. Of the 348,154 cumulative
miles the 37 routes cover, the model is within 0.0012%, or 4.17 miles.
2.6 Results and Analysis
The country of China is considered for the disruption analysis, with the maritime
chokepoints of the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Gibraltar being
closed to all ship traffic during the months of January and July of 2017. Chokepoints
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are closed for lengths of 30 and 60 days, then reopened. Although the model is
capable of analyzing any commodity, soybeans are the only commodity considered in
this analysis.
Four separate scenarios are analyzed: a baseline scenario with all chokepoints
open, and three additional scenarios each with a single chokepoint being closed. Sce-
narios have 30 replications each, and statistical significance is determined at the 0.05
alpha level. Measurements are taken each month and are not cumulative over months.
Each value indicates how much of a commodity was received in that month alone.
Chokepoint closures of 30 and 60 days in January 2017 revealed a statistically
significant dependency of Chinese soybean imports through the Panama Canal. How-
ever, this shortage is not immediately felt. Considering a 30-day closure, the impact
of a closure event in January is not seen until the following month of February, as
Figure 8 suggests.
Figure 8. Chinese Soybean Deliveries w/ 30-day Closure in Jan 2017
Compared to the baseline case, a 30-day closure of the Panama Canal in January
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caused a 31% decrease of average soybeans received in February. Subsequently, the
month of March experienced a 28% increase in average soybeans received as compared
to the baseline. This is likely due to the displaced ships finally arriving, and the
fact that the chokepoint reopened in February. No statistical relationship impacting
Chinese soybean imports was detected for closures of either the Suez Canal or Strait
of Gibraltar in the month January.
Figures 9 and 10 contain the same data as Figure 8, but also contain the 95%
confidence intervals around the mean. Figure 9 displays soybean imports to China for
the month of February 2017 - one month after a January 2017 closure of a chokepoint.
Figure 9. Chinese Soybeans (kg) - February Imports After January Closure (2017)
The month of March (Figure 10) sees the eventual increase of soybean imports to
China, as the rerouted ships finally arrive. The shortage caused by rerouting in one
month and subsequent late arrivals in the next are both statistically significant at the
alpha level of 0.05.
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Figure 10. Chinese Soybeans (kg) - March Imports After January Closure (2017)
Considering a closure of 60 days revealed results similar to a closure of 30 days,
as the same average soybean decrease was seen in February. However, due to the
extended length of the closure, the excess soybeans did not arrive until two months
later in April, as Figure 11 details.
Figure 11. Chinese Soybean Deliveries w/ 60-day Closures
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Closures during the month of July indicated no significant relationship as com-
pared to the baseline, despite more soybeans being delivered. This is most likely
related to where China sources its soybean imports. In 2017, China received 53% of
its soybeans from Brazil and 35% from the United States (United Nations Statistics
Division, 2019). As most Brazilian soybeans are exported from the country’s south-
ern ports, ships destined for China prefer southern maritime routes which bypass
the Panama Canal completely due to the shorter distance. Additionally, while some
Brazilian soybeans are exported from the country’s northern ports and subsequently
traverse the Panama Canal, the amount disrupted is not enough to significantly have
an overall impact.
Given the seasonal nature of agriculture, an excursion was explored to determine
if there exists a seasonal trend of when China is most sensitive to a chokepoint dis-
ruption. Chinese soybean imports are still considered, but only the Panama Canal
was tested with closure lengths of 30 days. Two years of trade data are used (2016
& 2017), and only one closure can occur in each month, for a total of 24 unique
scenarios. Table 1 contains the soybean shortage results.
Table 1. Chinese soybean shortage w/ 30-Day Panama Canal closure
Disruption Shortage 2016 2017
Jan Feb -28.7% -24.3%
Feb Mar -20.6% 0%
Mar Apr -14.1% 0%
Apr May 0% 0%
May Jun 0% 0%
Jun Jul 0% 0%
Jul Aug 0% 0%
Aug Sep 0% 0%
Sep Oct -11.6% -11.9%
Oct Nov -31.3% -23.1%
Nov Dec -27.3% -25.4%
Dec Jan -26.5% -21.6%
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According to Table 1, China is most sensitive to a Panama Canal closure during
the end of the year or at the beginning of the next. Again, this can be traced to
the soybean harvest season in the United States, which is during this time-frame (see
Figure 12).
Figure 12. U.S. and Brazilian Soybean Exports to China in 2017. Data source:
United Nations Statistics Division (2019)
However, China is not only sensitive to a closure of the Panama Canal. A closure
of the Suez Canal can also have a negative impact on shipments to China. Table 2
contains monthly ship arrivals to China, and is for all modeled commodities.
Ship arrivals can be linked directly to shortages, as the significant months in
the “Panama Canal” column of Table 2 match the significant months of the “2017”
column in Table 1. Both columns are measurements from the same year. Chapter 3
dives further into the relationship between the Suez Canal and China.
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Table 2. Chinese ship arrivals w/ 30-Day closures (2017)
Disruption Gibraltar Panama Canal Suez Canal
Jan 0% -11.6% 0%
Feb 0% 0% -10.0%
Mar 0% 0% 0%
Apr 0% 0% 0%
May 0% 0% -9.4%
Jun 0% 0% 0%
Jul 0% 0% -8.4%
Aug 0% 0% -8.5%
Sep 0% -7.3% 0%
Oct 0% -14.3% -6.5%
Nov 0% -13.4% -7.9%
Dec 0% -8.7% -7.4%
2.7 Conclusions
China is a leading importer of global soybeans, and predominately gets those
soybeans from both the United States and Brazil (United Nations Statistics Division,
2019). Given most of these soybeans travel via maritime means, this exposes China
to chokepoint disruption risk. Should a disruption happen, China could be facing a
heavy shortage of a diet staple, which could potentially result in famine if protective
measures are not taken.
Given the increasing size of the global economy, the free flow of goods becomes
more important each day. Although the event of any one chokepoint closing is ex-
tremely rare, the consequences can be painfully high. Historically, the United States
(and its Navy) has been the guarantor of global maritime trade, providing countries
access to global markets and enabling them to prosper. However, given the increasing
global climate of populism and ideas of isolationism coming from the United States
recently, maritime trade might not be as safe as historically seen.
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III. Case Study
3.1 Introduction
With globalization and the global economy, the world is now more connected
than ever. Never has there been an age where nations depended so heavily on other
nations for resources (i.e. oil). Merriam-Webster Online (2019) defines a resource
as “a natural feature or phenomenon that enhances the quality of human life.” Oil
certainly makes life easier, but it’s only there to “enhance.” What then, if not oil,
would be a resource that’s a requirement for human life? One answer is food, which
can be captured in a model using a representative set of cereals and soybeans (Jones
and Ejeta, 2016; Wellesley et al., 2017).
Maize, rice, and wheat make up almost two-thirds of the world’s dietary energy
needs (Jones and Ejeta, 2016). Of these three cereals, just six countries provide
70% of the global supply. Furthermore, soybeans account for three-quarters of global
livestock feed, and only three countries provide 80% of the global supply (Wellesley
et al., 2017). These megacrops are the backbone of the global food supply, and only
a handful of countries export them. According to Bailey and Wellesley (2017), 2.8
billion people are fed via food imports from the global transport system each year.
Assuming a population of seven billion people in the world, this equates to 40% of
the world’s population being reliant on global transport to meet their daily caloric
needs.
3.2 Background
Given the global requirement for imported food, the free flow of transportation
becomes important. A large proportion of the worlds traded cereals and soybeans are
shipped via maritime means (Bailey and Wellesley, 2017). Once loaded, these ships
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follow accepted maritime shipping routes, as shown in Figure 13.
Figure 13. Eurasia Maritime Shipping Routes (Kiln, 2019)
As can be seen in Figure 4, ship traffic concentrates around global maritime choke-
points. A chokepoint is “a strategic narrow route providing passage through or to
another region” (Merriam-Webster Online, 2019). In the case of maritime shipping,
these chokepoints connect one geographic body of water to another. The disruption
of the free flow of global cereals and soybeans through these chokepoints is the focus
of this study.
An estimated 55% of globally-traded cereals and soybeans are shipped via mar-
itime means that pass through at least one maritime chokepoint (Bailey and Wellesley,
2017). However, since not all oil exporting countries are food exporting countries, the
importance of food chokepoints might differ from existing oil chokepoints, or intro-
duce new chokepoints entirely. Unlike oil, chokepoint analysis for the global food
supply is scant.
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3.3 Maritime Shipping Simulations
Given the global use of maritime shipping and its importance to economic well–
being, the modeling of maritime networks is a frequent endeavor. Ducruet (2016)
modeled global maritime flows as complex networks to measure the vulnerability
of global maritime trade flows through the Suez and Panama Canals. Viljoen and
Joubert (2016) also used complex network theory to model global container shipping,
systematically removing links and nodes to determine the global maritime networks
robustness and flexibility. These models used optimization techniques, minimizing
either cost or distance. However, if a supply chain displays variance (demand variance,
quality variance, supplier variance, etc.), then methods of optimization are inadequate
and simulation is then the tool of choice (Ingalls, 1998). Furthermore, given the size
and complexities of supply chain networks, simulation is considered a valid approach
since it can incorporate uncertainties and adverse external events (Deleris and Erhun,
2005).
Specifically, concerning the variation introduced by weather, ship speeds, and
varying crop yields, simulation has been the preferred analytic method of choice
to capture this variability. Qu and Meng (2012) used a Cellular Automata (CA)
simulation model in conjunction with a discrete-event simulation to simulate ship
movements through the Singapore Strait. Caris et al. (2011) developed a discrete-
event simulation to model alternative transport options for container barges in the
port area of Antwerp. The authors analysis was mainly concerned with the impact
different hub scenarios had on waiting times and turnaround times for vessels within
the port area. Smith et al. (2009) modeled ship congestion in the Upper Mississippi
River with a discrete-event simulation, examining ship activities under a wide range
of operating conditions.
Concerning global chokepoints, Köse et al. (2003) used a discrete-event simulation
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to model ship traffic flowing through the Istanbul Strait, and found that an increase of
ship arrivals of just 36% causes ship waiting times to jump from a mere 16 minutes to
918 minutes. Mavrakis and Kontinakis (2008) built a similar discrete-event simulation
to model maritime traffic through the Strait as well and arrived at similar results.
Lopes et al. (2017) constructed a discrete-event simulation to improve the efficiency
of Brazil’s soybean exports.
A notable contribution to the study of maritime chokepoints in the global food
supply has been by Wellesley et al. (2017) and Bailey and Wellesley (2017). The
authors reconciled multiple maritime shipping databases into one single database.
This single database was then used to power the Chatham House Maritime Analysis
Tool (CH-MAT), an excel-based tool that models global cereals imports and exports.
The tool then allowed the authors to identify which chokepoints were most important
to certain cereals, and then determine which countries were most at risk to chokepoint
disruptions. However, no stochastic elements or seasonal trends were considered.
3.4 Model Development
This research develops a simulation model of a subset of world-wide maritime food
distribution with a focus on chokepoint disruption. The model was built in Simio and
follows the transport methodology set fourth by Woxenius (2007). Ships are modeled
as entities and carry a 55,000 Dry Weight Tonnage (Handymax/Supramax class).
Each month, metric tonnes of wheat, maize, and soybeans are shipped dry-bolk to
their destination. Ships travel directly to their destinations, as transshipping or
refuleing is not considered.
Distance is measured using the ArcGIS World Imagery functionality in Simio,
incorporating a hi-resolution scale satellite map on the background. This functionality
also permits placing model objects using lat/long coordinates (way-points), which
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allows for accurate distance measurements.
The importing countries of China, Japan, Egypt, and Spain were selected due to
their large import reliance of at least one of the commodities under study. Given
these four importers, six common exporters are selected - the United States, Brazil,
Canada, Argentina, Ukraine, and Russia. Using these six exporters provides a high
percentage of an importer’s annual supply of a commodity. Travel speed is stochastic
and is modeled via a triangular distribution, with maximum and minimum values
within 10% of the mean travel speed of 14 mph. Monthly commodities data is also
stochastic via a triangular distribution with maximum and minimum values within
10% of the United Nations’ reported monthly exported value.
Initial route selection is determined via distances collected from MarineTraffic
(2019) and are modeled herein. However, during a chokepoint disruption, a ship will
reroute itself using whichever route is shortest in distance. This occurs dynamically,
as the ship entity is continuously aware of which alternate route is fastest should
a chokepoint close. The same process is used when a chokepoint reopens, as the
reopened route might now be shortest.
3.5 Supporting Data, Verification and Validation
Commodities data used in this model are sourced from the United Nations Inter-
national Trade Statistics Database. This data is available in both monthly and annual
timeframes, and is available publicly (United Nations Statistics Division, 2019).
Monthly exports of wheat, maize, and soybeans from United Nations Statistics
Division (2019) are used to determine demand. Monthly data are preferred to annual
due to the fact the commodities under study are seasonal - the amount of grain a
country exports depends on the harvest season/month. Using monthly data provides
insight not only into which chokepoints are most critical for the shipment of these
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foodstuffs, but also which month is most critical as well.
The MarineTraffic (2019) database is used to validate model route distances.
MarineTraffic is a leader in ship tracking, using historical Automatic Identification
System (AIS) data to provide accurate estimates of ship movements. The AIS is a
vessel tracking system that utilizes a ship’s on-board transponder to track its where-
abouts. Using MarineTraffic’s Voyage Planner, the distance of 37 unique simulated
routes are compared to their matching real-world routes. Of the 348,154 cumulative
miles the 37 routes cover, the model is within 0.0012%, or 4.17 miles.
3.6 Comparison
The countries of China, Japan, Egypt, and Spain are considered for the disruption
analysis, with the maritime chokepoints of the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, and
the Strait of Gibraltar being individually closed to all ship traffic. Chokepoints are
closed for 30 days, then reopened. Monthly exports of wheat, maize, and soybeans
are considered.
Four separate scenarios are analyzed: a baseline scenario with all chokepoints
open, and three additional scenarios each with a single chokepoint being closed. Sce-
narios have 30 replications each, and statistical significance is determined at the 0.05
alpha level.
3.6.1 Panama Canal
Closing the Panama Canal for 30 days revealed a statistically significant decrease
in monthly wheat imports to Japan and Egypt, as shown in Table 3.
32
Table 3. Wheat via Panama Canal: 30-Day closures
Disruption China Japan Egypt Spain
Jan 0% -14.0% 0% -
Feb 0% 0% 0% -
Mar 0% -5.2% 0% -
Apr 0% 0% 0% -
May 0% 0% 0% -
Jun 0% -10.4% -3.7% -
Jul 0% -5.5% 0% -
Aug 0% -13.2% 0% -
Sep 0% -8.5% 0% -
Oct 0% -16.1% 0% -
Nov 0% -14.8% 0% -
Dec 0% -9.0% 0% -
Japan was most sensitive, experiencing significant decreases in nine of twelve
months. Egypt was less dependent, experiencing a significant decrease in only one
month. Egypt’s resilience in its wheat imports is likely due to it sourcing over 80%
of its imported wheat from Russia and Ukraine (United Nations Statistics Division,
2019). Neither country utilizes the Panama Canal to reach Egypt. However, both
Russia and Ukraine must use the Turkish Straits for maritime shipping, which is one
of the narrowest chokepoints in the world and has no alternate maritime route. The
Turkish Straits are not considered in this analysis.
Wheat imports to Spain are under-represented by this research and are therefore
omitted (denoted by “-”). Spain sourced only 10% of their 2017 wheat imports from
the six exporters in this study (United Nations Statistics Division, 2019).
Maize shipments between the six exporters and our four importers revealed no sig-
nificant decreases in monthly shipments. According to the United Nations Statistics
Division (2019), China, Japan, Egypt, and Spain sourced their 2017 maize imports
from countries that either bypass the Panama Canal completely, or use it only for a
portion of the total shipment.
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Soybean imports, however, were significantly impacted when the Panama Canal
closed.
Table 4. Soybeans via Panama Canal: 30-Day closures
Disruption China Japan Egypt Spain
Jan -24.3% -2.8% 0% -5.9%
Feb 0% 0% 0% -6.0%
Mar 0% 0% 0% 0%
Apr 0% 0% 0% 0%
May 0% 0% 0% 0%
Jun 0% -6.7% 0% 0%
Jul 0% -5.1% 0% 0%
Aug 0% 0% 0% 0%
Sep -11.9% -4.4% 0% 0%
Oct -23.1% 0% 0% -9.0%
Nov -25.4% -5.0% 0% -34.3%
Dec -21.6% -8.0% 0% -11.8%
According to United Nations Statistics Division (2019), China, Japan, and Spain
rely heavily on North and South America for their soybean imports. China is most
reliant on the United States and Brazil, with both countries supplying 89% of total
soybean exports to China in 2017. China’s sensitivity from closing the Panama Canal
occurs when it is importing soybeans from the United States, which utilizes the
Panama Canal to access the Pacific Ocean. Brazil bypasses the Panama Canal, as
the southern route utilizing the Cape of Good Hope and the Strait of Malacca is
shorter. Japan, however, is most reliant on the United States and Canada for their
soybean imports, receiving 84% of total imports from these two exporters in 2017
(United Nations Statistics Division, 2019). Both countries utilize the Panama Canal
to reach the Pacific.
Even though Spain is East of the Panama Canal, shipments from the West Coast
of the United States and Canada still traverse the Panama Canal to reach Spain.
Egypt experienced no significant impact from a Panama Canal closure, as it sourced
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almost 50% of its 2017 soybean imports from exporters that bypass the Panama
Canal.
3.6.2 Strait of Gibraltar
The Strait of Gibraltar connects the Atlantic Ocean with the Mediterranean Sea,
and is part of a sea route connecting the West to the East.
Wheat imports were impacted in only two of twelve months for both China and
Egypt, as displayed in Table 5.
Table 5. Wheat via Strait of Gibraltar: 30-Day closures
Disruption China Japan Egypt Spain
Jan 0% 0% 0% -
Feb 0% 0% 0% -
Mar 0% 0% 0% -
Apr 0% 0% 0% -
May 0% 0% 0% -
Jun 0% 0% -4.6% -
Jul 0% 0% -2.8% -
Aug 0% 0% 0% -
Sep 0% 0% 0% -
Oct -27.3% 0% 0% -
Nov 0% 0% 0% -
Dec -25.0% 0% 0% -
The impact to China can be traced back to its wheat imports from Eastern
Canada, as these shipments traverse the Strait of Gibraltar. Egypt is also sensi-
tive to a closure here, most likely due to it importing wheat from the United States
and Argentina, both of which use the strait as well.
Maize imports given a Strait of Gibraltar closure highlight an Egypt and Spain
dependency on maize from western exporters, as detailed in Table 6.
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Table 6. Maize via Strait of Gibraltar: 30-Day closures
Disruption China Japan Egypt Spain
Jan 0% 0% -6.0% 0%
Feb 0% 0% -7.7% 0%
Mar 0% 0% 0% 0%
Apr 0% 0% -25.7% -4.9%*
May 0% 0% 0% -11.1%*
Jun 0% 0% -59.3% -15.4%*
Jul 0% 0% -63.6% -49.9%*
Aug 0% 0% -59.8% -83.4%
Sep 0% 0% -52.0% -94.1%
Oct 0% 0% -62.8% -83.0%
Nov 0% 0% -67.9% -84.2%*
Dec 0% 0% -51.0% -62.5%
* Multiple months significant. Maximum shown.
Egypt and Spain imported 34% and 27% of their maize, respectively, from Ukraine
- an exporter that does not utilize the Strait of Gibraltar to export to these countries.
All other maize exporters represented in this research, however, utilize the Strait of
Gibraltar and would have to subsequently reroute around the Cape of Good Hope,
then traverse Bab-el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal to reach Egypt and Spain, a voyage
that would add weeks to any shipment and add additional cargo risk as ships traverse
additional chokepoints.
Soybeans are heavily sourced from western countries, and much like maize, this
commodity must also utilize the Strait of Gibraltar to reach Egypt and Spain. Table 7
contains the impact a closure of the Strait of Gibraltar has on soybean imports.
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Table 7. Soybeans via Straight of Gibraltar: 30-Day closures
Disruption China Japan Egypt Spain
Jan 0% 0% -37.4% -63.7%*
Feb 0% 0% -56.3% -83.9%*
Mar 0% 0% -56.3% -79.0%*
Apr 0% 0% -48.8% -87.2%
May 0% 0% -46.2% -75.2%*
Jun 0% 0% -40.0% -97.0%
Jul 0% 0% -58.4% -91.4%
Aug 0% 0% -52.8% -93.8%
Sep 0% 0% 0% -93.5%*
Oct 0% 0% -25.4% -90.0%
Nov 0% 0% -49.6% -66.0%
Dec 0% 0% -54.5% -31.7%*
* Multiple months significant. Maximum shown.
According to the United Nations Statistics Division (2019), both Egypt and Spain
sourced most of their soybean imports in 2017 from the United States, Brazil, and
Argentina - all countries that utilize the Strait of Gibraltar to reach these importers.
While both countries would see significant monthly decreases in their soybean imports,
Egypt is still better positioned as it received 23% of its 2017 soybean imports from
Ukraine and bypassing the Strait of Gibraltar all together.
3.6.3 The Suez Canal
The Suez Canal heads in Egypt and connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Red
Sea. Much like the Strait of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal is a link in the chain connecting
West to East.
Closing the Suez Canal had a significant impact on Chinese wheat imports (Ta-
ble 8), with six of twelve months displaying a significant decrease.
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Table 8. Wheat via The Suez Canal: 30-Day closures
Disruption China Japan Egypt Spain
Jan 0% 0% 0% -
Feb 0% 0% 0% -
Mar 0% 0% 0% -
Apr 0% 0% 0% -
May -17.7% 0% 0% -
Jun 0% 0% 0% -
Jul -20.0% 0% 0% -
Aug -24.5% 0% 0% -
Sep 0% 0% 0% -
Oct -34.3% 0% 0% -
Nov -28.3% 0% 0% -
Dec -58.9% 0% 0% -
China sourced 15% of its 2017 wheat imports from Canada, and when exported
from Canada’s East Coast these exports traverse the Suez Canal. Closing the Suez
Canal forces ships to turnaround and exit the Mediterranean through the Strait of
Gibraltar, adding up to a week of additional travel time.
Chinese maize imports appear to be impacted if the Suez Canal closes, as depicted
in Table 9.
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Table 9. Maize via The Suez Canal: 30-Day closures
Disruption China Japan Egypt Spain
Jan 0% 0% 0% 0%
Feb 0% 0% 0% 0%
Mar -73.7% 0% 0% 0%
Apr -35.5% 0% 0% 0%
May -29.6% 0% 0% 0%
Jun 0% 0% 0% 0%
Jul 0% 0% 0% 0%
Aug 0% 0% 0% 0%
Sep 0% 0% 0% 0%
Oct -27.3% 0% 0% 0%
Nov 0% 0% 0% 0%
Dec -25.0% 0% 0% 0%
According to the United Nations Statistics Division (2019), Ukraine supplied
China with over 61% of its maize imports in 2017, and utilizes the Suez Canal to
ship east to China. China also sourced 27% of its 2017 maize imports from the
United States - an exporter that bypasses the Suez Canal in favor of the Panama
Canal when shipping to China. This provides China a buffer should the Suez Canal
close.
Soybean shipments with the Suez Canal closed resulted in no significant decreases
in the four importing countries studied. This is likely due to where these four im-
porters reside geographically, and the exporters chosen to study. Soybeans exported
to China and Japan utilize the Panama Canal, and those exported to Egypt and
Spain utilize the Panama Canal, the Strait of Gibraltar, and the Turkish Straits
(those exported from Ukraine).
3.6.4 Impact of Closures on the Strait of Malacca
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2014), the Strait of
Malacca is one of the world’s most important strategic chokepoints by volume of oil
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transit, connecting the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. In 2016, oil flows through
here rose to 16 million barrels per day, and is considered the second busiest transit
chokepoint behind the Strait of Hormuz. Oil shipments through the Strait of Malacca
supply the growing economies of China and Indonesia.
Given the Strait of Malacca’s importance in global trade, the free flow of ship
traffic becomes paramount. However, this free flow could be jeopardized with the
closure of a chokepoint half a world away.
When a chokepoint closes, ships will reroute to their destination using the shortest
route available. If a ship is destined for China and the Panama Canal closes, the
shortest route often available is one utilizing the Strait of Malacca. Should an entire
fleet of exports need to reroute to traverse the Strait of Malacca and not be able to
pass due to increased arrivals, the free flow of ship traffic is no longer viable and the
system could come to an abrupt halt.
The following analysis is a measure of monthly arrivals to the Strait of Malacca
given a chokepoint closure of 30 days. Arrival values are listed for each month (using
2017 data) as percentage increase or decreases from the baseline case of no closures.
Each figure is a representation of what the Strait of Malacca could expect if a choke-
point closed.
Figure 14 depicts monthly expected arrival increases to the Strait of Malacca
should the Panama Canal close for 30 days during the listed month. Given the large
distance between the Panama Canal and the Strait of Malacca, listed arrival increases
are offset by two months. For example, if the Panama Canal closed in January, the
listed increase of 80% occurs two months later in March. The figure lists the 80% in
January because that is when the chokepoint initially closed.
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Figure 14. Strait of Malacca Traffic w/ 30-Day Panama Canal Closure
According to Figure 14, should the Panama Canal close, the Strait of Malacca
could expect at least a 51% increase in the exports studied in all months, as compared
to the baseline, with a maximum increase of nearly double if the Panama Canal closed
in the month of December.
Should the Strait of Gibraltar close, smaller increases could be expected, as shown
in Figure 15. Unlike Figure 14, the data listed in Figure 15 is offset by only one month,
as the Strait of Gibraltar is closer.
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Figure 15. Strait of Malacca Traffic w/ 30-Day Strait of Gibraltar Closure
Traffic increases of at least 20% could be expected, with the largest impact coming
from a closure of the Strait of Gibraltar in January. This is likely due to exports
emanating from the western United States and Canada to Egypt and Spain, as the
primary route is to utilize the Panama Canal then the Strait of Gibraltar. The
alternate route for these exporters is to then utilize the Strait of Malacca.
A closure of the Suez Canal (Figure 16), however, results in traffic decreases in
the Strait of Malacca. The data in Figure 16 is comparable to Figure 15, with arrival
percentages being experienced one month after the listed closure.
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Figure 16. Strait of Malacca Traffic w/ 30-Day Suez Canal Closure
These decreases are likely attributed to ship traffic originating in Russia, Ukraine,
and Eastern Canada with a destination of Japan. These exporters utilize the Suez
Canal and eventually the Strait of Malacca to export to Japan. Should the Suez Canal
close, these exporters would traverse the Panama Canal to reach Japan, completely
bypassing the Strait of Malacca.
3.7 Conclusions
North and South America are top exporters of the global food supply. Given most
of this food supply travels via maritime means, this exposes any importing country to
substantial chokepoint disruption risk. Should a disruption happen, importers could
be facing heavy shortages of diet staples, which could potentially result in famine
if protective measures are not taken. Shipping costs could skyrocket, as shipping
companies are accumulating more distance to reroute around a closure. A shipping
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cost increase would likely be passed on to the consumer, which could cause the market
for these commodities to also skyrocket.
Should the Strait of Malacca experience the increased traffic as detailed in this
analysis, oil tankers traversing there will be slowed if not stopped. If oil tankers, or
any valuable commodity be slowed or stopped in the Strait of Malacca, cargo safety
will be a concern as the waters there have a history of piracy (Hassan and Hasan,
2017).
Given the increasing size of the global economy, the free flow of goods becomes
more important each day. Although the event of any one chokepoint closing is ex-
tremely rare, the consequences can be painfully high.
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IV. Conclusions
4.1 Research Summary
The maritime transport system is the backbone of the global food supply, and
arguably the global economy. As the world’s population grows, an ever-increasing
amount of ships will traverse these maritime chokepoints on their way to countries
who’s well-being depends completely on their safe and expeditious arrival. The more
reliant a country becomes on the maritime transport system, the larger amount of
risk they accept.
Considering over half of the world’s exported supply of wheat, rice, maize, and
soybeans are exported via maritime means, the free flow of marine traffic becomes
paramount. Current models lack the ability to capture the inherent variance displayed
in the maritime transport system, which can lead to inaccurate assumptions about
how the system functions - assumptions that could ultimately bring chaos to an
importing economy.
To capture this inherent variance, a discrete-event simulation was built in order
to better understand how disruptions in this system impact those who rely on its
unhindered functionality. This simulation models ships as entities, with carrying
capacities near those of the Handymax/Supramax class. Ships originate in port at an
exporting location, then travel along accepted maritime routes to the importer. The
commodities of wheat, maize, and soybeans are studied, using monthly export data
from the United Nations Statistics Division (2019) to increase granularity and thus
provide better estimates of how the system functions on a monthly basis. Rice was
not considered, as its primary exporters were not explicitly modeled. The maritime
chokepoints of the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Gibraltar were
modeled for disruption. Chokepoints are closed to all ship traffic for lengths of 30
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and 60 days, then reopened.
Results indicate significant food shortages as compared to the baseline for all
importers studied, with some receiving 97% less of a commodity as compared to
the same month in the baseline case. Chinese imports of soybeans are particularly
sensitive to a closure of the Panama Canal in the months of September - January.
Egypt and Spain could expect significant decreases of maize and soybeans if the Strait
of Gibraltar was closed in any month, with Spain experiencing its worst declines
should a disruption occur in September.
Marine traffic through the Strait of Malacca was significantly impacted when
one of the three chokepoints studied were closed. Specifically, the Strait of Malacca
experienced increases of at least 51% when the Panama Canal closed in any month,
with the largest increase of 91% expected if the Panama Canal were to close in
December.
4.2 Future Work
Chokepoint capacity should be modeled, as this research assumed an infinite
amount of ships could pass through a chokepoint each day. However, this is clearly not
the case. Each global chokepoint has an assumed maximum throughput of ships it can
handle per day, and capturing this metric could illuminate further how disruptions
impact global trade.
Given the Strait of Malacca’s importance to global trade, modeling this chokepoint
for disruption could reveal more dependencies in the maritime transportation system.
Additionally, the Strait of Malacca has two alternate routes within close proximity -
the Sunda Strait between the islands of Java and Sumatra, and the Lombok Strait
between the islands of Bali and Lombok. Both straits are capable of providing traffic
relief should the Strait of Malacca be overwhelmed. Should all three straits experience
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a disruption (i.e. a blockade), the impact could have global consequences.
Additional countries and specific ports could be modeled, adding more insight
into the system. Furthermore, as the simulation is already designed to import/export
an unlimited amount of resources, additional commodities should be added to better
define importer/exporter relationships. Commodities such as oil and raw materials
could illuminate additional maritime dependencies.
Considering the transport system for the global food supply is multi-modal, the
addition of rail networks to the simulation would add additional understanding, as
alternate routes might include a leg of rail shipments. Moreover, an analysis such as
this but specifically for oil transportation could prove fruitful, as the oil transportation
system is multi-model as well. For example, should the Strait of Hormuz close, only
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have oil pipelines that can circumvent
the chokepoint. However, they are at far lesser throughput (U.S. Energy Information
Administration, 2014).
To better model real-world decision making, additional maritime routes should
be added. Specifically, as the earth’s temperature increases, routes along the North-
west Passage become viable, and are often of shorter distance than southern routes.
However, with the addition of the Northwest Passage comes the potentiality of a
new set of global chokepoints. Further analysis should assume these northern routes
will eventually fully open and might become the new global standard, bringing the
economies of the world closer together.
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Appendix A. Simio Model Screenshots
Figure 17. Model overview
Figure 18. Panama Canal traffic
48
Figure 19. Strait of Malacca traffic
Figure 20. Route list (includes all hubs to traverse)
Figure 20 details how an exporter can get to an importer, with corresponding
priorities. If a ship is on a certain route and a chokepoint closes, the model searches
for ships that are on routes that contain this chokepoint (row search). If it does, the
model places this ship on a route that is clear.
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Figure 21. Hub-to-hub routes (node list)
Figure 21 details how ships move from hub to hub (Simio node list). The “ErrN”
node is an error node, which stops the simulation should a ship reach it. This was
used for debugging.
Figure 22. Monthly export schedule
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Figure 22 displays how the model creates commodity shipments. Given a certain
month and year, the model will search this table finding entries that match. This
allows for an unlimited amount of commodities can be added, so long as they have
values in each column (Commodity ID must be unique).
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Appendix B. Input Data
Figure 23. Example of monthly data download (United Nations Statistics Division,
2019)
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